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Case Comments
Decisions of International
and Foreign Tribunals
International Court of Justice
Germany v. Iceland
United Kingdom v. Iceland
On June 5, 1972, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
filed in the Registry of the International Court of Justice an application
instituting proceedings against Iceland as a result of the decision of the
Government of Iceland to extend, as from September I, 1972, the limits of
its zone of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 nautical miles from the
baselines to 50 nautical miles.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany bases the jurisdiction of the Court, for the purposes of the preceedings, on Articles 35
and 36 of the Statute of the Court, on an exchange of Notes of July 19,
1961 between the Governments concerned, and on a Declaration of October 29, 1971 whereby the Federal Republic of Germany accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with a Security Council resolution
of October 15, 1946.
Germany predicates its application on the same principles of international law as had been urged by the United Kingdom in its application, filed April 14, 1972, instituting proceedings against Iceland on the
same subject of fisheries jurisdiction. See 6 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
665 (July, 1972).
On July 21, 1972 a request by Germany for the indication of interim
measures of protection in this case was handed to the Registrar of the
Court.
The Court has decided to hold a public sitting at the Peace Palace on
*B.A. (1940) and LL.B. (1942), Tulane University: member American Inter-American,
Louisiana State, New Orleans (member, Executive Committee), and Federal Bar Associ),
ations, American Judicature Society and Maritime Law Association; president (1972New Orleans Chapter, Federal Bar Association: president (1957- 1959), Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity.
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Wednesday, August 2, 1972 for the purpose of hearing the representatives
of the parties on the subject of this request.
In the case of United Kingdom v. Iceland, the Government of the
United Kingdom had filed on July 19, 1972, its request for the indication of
provisional measures of protection, and will be heard on the subject at a
public sitting of the Court on August 1.
Article 41, paragraph I, of the Statute of the Court confers upon it the
power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights
of either party pending final decision. The applicable procedure is laid
down by Article 61 of the Rules of Court which provides, in part, that "a
request for the indication of interim measures of protection shall have
priority over all other cases. The decision shall be treated as a matter of
urgency."
Requests for the indication of interim measures of protection were
received by the Court in two previous cases, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
and Interhandel.
India v. Pakistan
At nine public sittings held from 19 to 23 June, and on 27, 28 and 30
June and 3 July, counsel for India and Pakistan addressed argument to the
Court on behalf of their Governments in this appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council. See 6 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER 201
(January, 1972) and 665 (July, 1972).
The written pleadings in the case were filed on the following dates:
- Memorial of India: December 22, 197 1;
- Counter-Memorial of Pakistan: February 29, 1972;
- Reply of India: April 17, 1972 (the time-limit, originally fixed at March
30, was extended at the request of the Indian Government by an Order of
March 20);
- Rejoinder of Pakistan: May 16, 1972 (time-limit fixed by the Order of
March 20).
By authorization of the Court, these pleadings were made accessible to the
public as from June 19.
In its response to India's contentions (see 6 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER at p. 202), Pakistan has urged that:
a-the question of Pakistan aircraft overflying India and Indian aircraft
overflying Pakistan is governed by the Convention and Transit Agreement;
b-the contention of the Government of India that the Council has no
jurisdiction to handle the matters presented by Pakistan in its Application is
misconceived:
c-the Appeal preferred by the Government of India against the decision
of the Council in respect of Pakistan's Complaint is incompetent;
d-if the answer to the submission in c above is in the negative, then the
contention of the Government of India that the Council has no jurisdiction to
consider the Complaint of Pakistan, is misconceived;
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e-the manner and method employed by the Council in reaching its decisions are proper, fair and valid; and
f-the decisions of the Council in rejecting the Preliminary Objections of
the Government of India are correct in law.
At the recent public hearings, the contentions of India were presented
by his Excellency Lt.-General Yadavindra Singh, as Agent, and by Mr.
N. A. Palkhivala, as Chief Counsel, and those of Pakistan by His Excellency Mr. J. G. Kharas, as Agent, and Mr. Yahya Bakhtiar, as Chief
Counsel. Mr. Palkhivala and Mr. Bakhtiar also answered questions put to
them by various members of the Court.
At the end of the sitting of July 3, Vice-President Ammoun, Acting
President in the case, declared the oral proceedings closed and stated that
the Agents would be informed in due course of the date fixed for the public
reading of the judgment. The Court will now proceed to its private deliberation of the case.
Rules of Court
On May 10, 1972, the Court adopted a number of amendments to its
Rules of Court, and a new edition of the Rules, incorporating these amendments, was published on June 6, 1972. The new Rules of Court will
become effective on September 1, 1972, but the existing Rules will continue to apply to all phases of cases submitted to the Court before that date.
Of the 85 articles of the prior Rules, 18 were amended or subdivided,
and a number of new articles were added, so that the new Rules comprise
9 1 articles, 23 of which are new or have amended texts.*
The amendments are intended to make the procedure as simple and
expeditious as possible, to provide for greater flexibility, and to endeavor
to reduce the cost for the parties, both in contentious proceedings [at the
written stage (present Articles 37 to 38 and 40 to 42) and at the oral stage
(present Articles 48, 51 to 52 and 57 to 60)] and in advisory proceedings
(present Article 82). In addition, the provisions as to assessors (Article 7),
preliminary objections (present Article 62) and the formation of Chambers
(present Articles 24 and 7 1 and 72) have been made more detailed.
The Rules of Court, which were initially adopted on May 10, 1946 and
which remained unchanged until the present amendments, should be distinguished from the Statute of the Court, which was adopted in 1945 at the
San Francisco Conference, and which is an intergral part of the United
Nations Charter. The purpose of the Rules, which are drafted by the Court
itself, is to spell out the detailed application of the Statute in terms of the
organization and procedure of the Court.
*From Article 25 onwards, the numbering of the articles has been changed and will no
longer correspond to the numbering of the existing Rules.
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While the Court has not yet completed the entire revision of its Rules, it
decided at this time to modify those articles listed above which appeared to
call for priority amendments as a matter of immediate usefulness. The
Court is to continue its work on the general revision of the Rules.
Application for Review of a Judgment of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal
On July 3, 1972 the International Court of Justice received from the
Secretary-General of the United Nations a request for an advisory opinion
on an administrative issue.
Mr. Mohamed Fasla, an official of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), was the holder of a fixed-term appointment which was
due to expire on December 3 1, 1969. As this appointment was not renewed, Mr. Fasla appealed successively to the two bodies competent to
hear applications alleging non-observance of the terms of appointment or
contracts of employment of staff members, that is, the Joint Appeals Board
(1969- 1971) and the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
(1970-1972). As a result, the Administrative Tribunal, sitting in Geneva
on April 28, 1972, rendered Judgment No. 158, whereby it decided that
Mr. Fasla should receive six months' salary and was entitled to submit
certain claims for reimbursement to the Secretary-General.
Mr. Fasla considered that the Administrative Tribunal had not fully
considered and passed upon all his claims, and he therefore applied under
Article II of the Tribunal's Statute for a review of the judgment. In
accordance with the provisions of that Article, his application was examined by the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative
Tribunal Judgments, a committee which is composed of the member states,
the representatives of which have served on the General Committee of the
most recent regular session of the General Assembly. In New York, on
June 20, the Committee on Applications decided to request the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question whether the Administrative Tribunal had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in
it or had committed a fundamental error in procedure which had occasioned a failure of justice. When the Court has rendered its advisory opinion,
the Secretary-General has either to give it effect or to request the Tribunal
to convene specially in order to confirm its original decision or render a
new one.
Argentina
Re Jackson and Sanchez Archila,

(Federal Court, La Plata, Dec. 15, 197 1), 66 AM.J.
INT'L LAW 636 (July, 1972)
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 4

Case Comments

893

Jackson, a United States national, and Sanchez Archila, a Guatemalan
national, were charged with hijacking a Braniff aircraft over Mexico in
July, 197 1, and diverting it to Buenos Aires from its scheduled destination
in New York. They held the aircraft and crew for some twenty hours after
landing at Buenos Aires before surrendering to the police. They were
charged under Article 198(3) of the Argentine Penal Code with the offense
of seizure of an aircraft by threat or force. Both of the accused were found
guilty and were sentenced to imprisonment.
At the time of the offense, Argentina was not a party to either the
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft (Tokyo Convention) (20 U.S. Treaties 2941; T.I.A.S., No. 6768)
or the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(T.I.A.S., No. 7192). In considering the question of jurisdiction in this
instance of international aircraft hijacking, the court held:
According to the record of the investigation and evidence offered at the trial,
Jackson forced the pilot and crew by threats and a display of weapons to
submit to his orders, throughout the entire flight, in effect seizing command of
the aircraft. The use of threats and arms characterizes the new type of

offender contemplated in Article 198(3), for there can be no doubt that the

pilot and crew acted in response to the fear which Jackson had generated in
the course of the offense for which he is now being tried. The seizure of the
aircraft and detention of those rightfully in control of it while it was in flight
as well as standing in the airport ... constitute acts which have been consummated within the jurisdiction of the Republic. (Article I, Penal Code.)
India

MIS. V1O Tractoroexport, Moscow v. MIS. Tarapore and Co., Madras, 58
A.I.R., S.C. I Pt. 685, Jan. 1971 (Supreme Court of India), 66 AM. J.
LAW. 637 (July, 1972)

INT'L.

Plaintiff, an Indian company, sought an interim injunction restraining
defendant, a Russian firm, from participating in arbitral proceedings in
Moscow relative to a controversy over the sale of certain excavating
machinery to plaintiff under a contract concluded in 1965 and a letter of
credit open by plaintiff with the Bank of India in favor of the defendant.
Plaintiff had complained to defendant about certain defects in the machinery delivered to it, and, thereafter, when the rupee was devalued,
defendant demanded an increase in the letter of credit to cover this change.
Plaintiff filed suit in Madras for breach of contract and sought an injunction
on payments on the letter of credit as well as on certain devaluation drafts.
In November, 1967, defendant began an arbitral proceeding in Moscow in
pursuance of an arbitration clause in the contract, and also sought to stay
the suit in Madras, arguing that the dispute should have been submitted
first to arbitration in Moscow, and invoking Section 3 of the Foreign
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 4
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Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961 (XLV, 1961, cited by
the court), the law implementing the 1958 Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (330 U.N. Tfeaty Series 38),
which section provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Arbitration Act, 1940, or in the
Code of Civil Procedures, 1908, if any party to a submission made in
pursuance of an agreement to which the Convention set forth in the Schedule
applies, or any person claiming through or under him commences any legal
proceedings in any Court against any other party to the submission or any
person claiming through or under him in respect to any matter agreed to be
referred any party to such legal proceedings may, at any time after appearance and before filing a written statement or taking any other step in the
proceedings, apply to the Court to stay the proceedings, and the Court unless
satisfied that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed or that there is not in fact any dispute between the parties with
regard to the matter agreed to be referred shall make an order staying the
proceedings. (58 A.I.R., S.C. 1, 5.)
In January, 1968, plaintiff filed application for an interim injunction against
defendant's continuing the arbitration proceeding in Moscow. Defendant's
application for a stay was dismissed by the lower court and plaintiff's
application for the interim injunction was granted. Defendant appealed
from both orders, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.
The first question considered was whether there was a conflict between
the language of Section 3 and that of Article 11(3) of the Convention which
provides:
The Court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in
respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of
this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed. (Id.)
After examining the background of the 1961 Act and earlier Indian and
English legislation for the implementation of international arbitral agreements, the Supreme Court held:
As it was open to the legislature to deviate from the terms of the Protocol
[1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses] and the Convention [1927
Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards] it appears
to have given only a limited effect to the provisions of the 1958 Convention.
A clear deviation from the rigid and strict rule that the courts must stay a suit
whenever an international commercial arbitration as contemplated by the
Protocol and the Conventions, was to take place, is to be found in Sec. 3. It is
of a nature which is common to all provisions relating to stay in English and
Indian arbitration laws, the provisions being that the application to the court
for stay of the suit must be made by a party before filing a written statement
or taking any other step in the proceedings. If the condition is not fulfilled, no
stay can be granted. It cannot thus be said that Sec. 3 of the Act or similar
provisions in the prior Act of 1937 or the English Statutes were enacted to
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give effect in its entirety to the strict rule contained in the Protocol and the
Conventions. (Id. 10.)

With regard to the issuance of the injunction against the arbitration
proceeding, defendant had urged that, because neither it nor the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce
was subject to the jurisdiction of Indian courts, this order had no effect, but

the court said:
Ordinarily, a party which has entered into a contract of which an arbitral
clause forms an intergral part should not receive the assistance of the Court
when it seeks to resile from it. But in the present case a suit is being tried in
the Courts of this country which, for the reasons already stated, cannot be
stayed under Section 3 of the Act in the absence of an actual submission of
the disputes to the arbitral tribunal at Moscow prior to the institution of the
suit. The only proper course to follow is to restrain the Russian Firm which
has gone to the Moscow Tribunal for adjudication of the disputes from getting
the matter decided by the tribunal so long as the suit here is pending and has
not been disposed of. (Id. 12.)
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